전쟁사 분석을 통한 해군의 억제(Deterrence) 전략 적용 방안 연구: 억제이론과 해군의 역할을 중심으로

유인혁^*

해군 소령/해군대학 지휘참모과정 학생장교

Application of Naval Deterrence Strategy Through War History Analysis: Focus on Deterrence Theory and the Role of the Navy

In-Hyeok Yu^*

LCDR, ROK Navy/Student officer of Naval Commander & Step Course, ROK Naval War College

Correspondence to: *In-Hyeok Yu 32801, Unit 111, No. 1003, 98 Sindoan 2-gil, Sindoan-myeon, Gyeryong-si, Chungcheongnam-do, Republic of Korea E-mail: dlsgur123456@naver.com

초록

본 연구는 전쟁사 속 억제 실패사례를 분석하여 한반도 전장에서 해군의 억제 전략 적용 방안을 도출하는 데 목적이 있다. 이를 위해 억제의 핵심 요소를 능력(capability), 신뢰성(credibility), 소통(communication)의 3C 모델로 설정하고, 태평양전쟁과 포클랜드전쟁을 사례로 분석하였다. 분석 결과, 억제 실패는 단순한 군사력 부족이 아니라 상대가 인식하는 전력 배치의 취약성, 대응 의지에 대한 불신, 레드라인과 보복 의지의 불명확한 소통이 결합될 때 발생하였다. 따라서 한국 해군은 해상기반 응징·거부능력을 강화하고, 반복훈련과 즉응태세를 통해 신뢰성을 확보하며, 북한의 오판을 차단할 수 있는 명확한 억제 메시지를 지속적으로 발신해야 한다.

Abstract

This study aimed to derive implications for applying naval deterrence strategy on the Korean Peninsula by analyzing historical cases of deterrence failure. Using the 3C model of deterrence—capability, credibility, and communication—this study examined the Pacific and Falklands Wars. The analysis showed that deterrence failed because of not only insufficient military power, but also perceived capability gaps, doubts about political and military resolve, and the ambiguous communication of red lines and consequences. These findings suggest that the Republic of Korea Navy should strengthen maritime-based punishment and denial capabilities, enhance credibility through repeated exercises and readiness, and communicate clear deterrent signals to prevent North Korean miscalculation.

Keywords:

Deterrence Strategy, Naval Power, 3C Model, Pacific War, Falklands War, Korean Peninsula

키워드:

억제전략, 해군력, 3C 모델, 태평양전쟁, 포클랜드전쟁, 한반도

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